Abstract. How the self perceives reality is a traditional topic of research across several disciplines. I examine the perceived self on Facebook, as a caseBailenson (2011), I consider the distinction between the real and the virtual rethinking the perceived self in terms of social reality (Neisser, 1993) . This claim dovetails Jenkins's (2013) notion of the self as an active participant in consumption. I argue that the perceived self in social media could be conceived in terms of how it would like to be perceived and appraised by its virtual audience. Using Neisser's (1993) typology of self-knowledge and Castañeda's (1983) theory of I-guises, I analyse seven samples from Anglo-American and Bulgarian Facebook sites and show that the perceived self produces itself online as a captivating presence with a credible story. My samples are taken from FB community pages with negligible cultural differences across an online the perceived self online, as well as recent critiques of technoconsumerism. 
media combines local and global viewpoints, being in "grounded" reality (sitting at the computer) and in virtual reality (online).
3 My analysis addresses the problem of rethinking the impact of virtual reality on our grounded selves. The perceived self in social media appears in virtual reality and this latter disempowers the traditional notion of reality as the world around and beyond the self.
I focus on the millenial generation's view -a generation also known in only exacerbated." 4 This generation is immersed in virtual reality, yet lives in "grounded" reality. I examine social media mainly used by twixters because that to turn themselves into brands, with 'friend' and 'follower' tallies that serve as Time journalist Joel Stein (2013, 3) . The action the perceived self performs on Facebook (from here on abbreviated as FB) is to produce an autobiographical narrative with a likeable protagonist. The narrative's success is measured by the number of "likes" evaluating the perceived self's performance. A well-evaluated self-performance or autobiographical narrative implies that the perceived self is a praised and appreciated self. Online instant shift from grounded to virtual reality. I argue that the performing self discloses itself online as it would like to be perceived and that this performance has , a notion I explain in section 3. The samples from FB cited in what follows, show how a millenial-generation perceived self produces itself in a social space-time as a captivating presence with a credible story action.
The perceived self on FB is an autobiographical self which constructs an online identity through narrative, yet the perceived self in social media is not limited to pictorial narratives. 5 Virtual space simulates closeness by bypassing large physical 3 On the use of "grounded 4
Cf. Stein (2013, 1-2) : "Millennials consist, depending on whom you ask, of people born from 1980 to 2000. […] In the U.S., millennials are the children of baby boomers, who are also known as the Me Generation, who then produced the Me Me Me Cf. also Ben Agger's through electronic means such as the Internet, television, and cell phones. Virtuality is the experience of being online and using computers; it […] refer[s] to a particular way of experiencing and interacting with the world." I discuss the perceived self in social media, which I take as equivalent to the virtual self in a social structure. Unlike Agger, however, I avoid post-Marxist ideology. 5
Thus algorithm-controlled avatars can take on whatever shapes the grounded self has in mind and act out the latter's desires in online worlds like Second Life. Rethinking the Perceived Self: Samples from Facebook distances between participants, so communication takes place in a social space unimpeded by the laws of physics (Blasovich and Bailenson 2011, 135) . Roughly perceived reality. The online autobiographical self occurs and evolves in a social its author. This is not the case in traditional autobiography, where the protagonist lacks a temporal horizon, unlike its author. As narratologist Marie-Laure Ryan (2006, invented or experienced, events are emplotted retrospectively." Autobiographical selves in virtual space-time break this rule because they co-exist with their grounded selves in physical space-time. In section 4, below, I give examples of virtual selves whose storyline and timeline diverges from their grounded selves, because virtual selves are uncontrollable and leave non-erasable traces. The perceived self in social media is a narrator with a point of view, expressed both author and protagonist of her narrative. Points of view belong to a mindset. Philosopher of language Hector-Neri Castañeda (1983) developed this 'mindset' notion with the double connection between singular reference and objects in the world. "Every utterance expressing a thought (whether believed or not) is in principle and at bottom subordinated to an implicit I think that (or, even, to an I say that)" (1983, 60). 6 Self-perceived reality depends on the viewer's perspective, who, namely the self) at a certain time (when), in a certain place (where) and in a certain socio-cultural context (from or in which) it relates to things. These markers coordinate the telling and showing of an event or action by denoting its spatio-temporal position (the content or data to be interpreted) and serve as guidelines for an addressee ("you") -virtual or grounded.
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FB is the context of the self's perceived reality, the content of which is patched together by an online self in relation with itself and other online selves. This self is a multifaceted doublet of "I" and "you," with a double connection between "I" and the objects it refers to (Castañeda 1983, 60-62) . In my view, the peculiarity of 6 The double connection of oratio obliqua and oratio recta, as well as Bühler's work on imagination-oriented deixis and free shiftability is examined by François Recanati (2007), in Perspectival Thought. 7 According to psycholinguists Bühler (1934 ), Fillmore (1997 ), Jakobson (1972 ), Lyons (1975 these are the deictic coordinates of subjective orientation. I examine this in Kasabova (2010) .
(iii) The perceived self in the third-person (an interpersonal self as it appears to others, a participant in a virtual audience) (iv) The perceived self as protagonist in the second person (a projected self, as it would like to be perceived) (v) The perceived self as the author (sitting in front of its computer and virtually, as a gossip and trickster) self-knowledge on which my analysis is based. Neisser's (1993) typology of the perceived self divides into 5 types of self-knowledge. (1) the ecological self, which is the embodied self in the physical world and in regard to their immediate environment -the author. (2) the interpersonal self or the relation of the self to other people -the audience. (3) The temporally extended self -the narrator, (4) 1. How the Five Types of Self-Perception Appear in Social Media reality online, reframed by Tumblr-hosted community "
," 8 I argue that perceived reality in social media is not just virtual, but social and interpersonal. I assume that the main roles of the perceived self are intertwined and I reorder them for the purpose of this study: (1) the selfor perceived self-in-process -an autobiographical self with an idealistic narrator; (3) the interpersonal self -engaged in, and receiving feedback from, a social world -and (4) the conceptual or assumptive self which is a projectable and possible self -as it would like to be perceived. From these four types follows (5) Neisser's "ecological" self which inhabits two niches: i) the physical world, as a grounded self in front of a computer and ii) in the virtual world as a gossip and trickster.
The self as it would like to be perceived, (4), is expressed either in the indicative (conditional) or the subjunctive. The self in Fig. 2 expresses what would be the case if it were perceived as it should be. It is an appellative self-perceived self which wants to appear likeable and to reveal itself to its prospective public as a seductive persona, for the self-perceived self in online networks is an alluring self. Hence I propose the following interpretation of Fig. 2 : "If I am seen online, I should look in indirect speech. The internal structure of the perceived self is expressed in both 1.1. The Perceived Self and Its "I-Guises" Castañeda (1983) develops the idea that the self has guises -perceived appearances, aspects, and postures and that these guises offer a double connection between singular reference and objects in the world: there is a double relation between word and thought on one hand, and thought and thing, on the other. The connection between "I" and things is twofold, secured by oratio obliqua and oratio recta, respectively.
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appeal or what it wants to communicate, direct speech explicitly expresses the relation between a grammatical subject and an action in a predicative statement. These statements have an underlying attributive act, such as: "I think here now" or, in our case, "I want here now to be seen as" -which is explicitly expressed by: "you're really awesome." Consider Fig. 3 "A hard life makes you strong," from Bulgarian twixter communities "Bully, so that they'll respect you" and "I don't care about your opinion." 11 so that your hard life is appreciated by your peers (the audience). Oratio obliqua shows it is their appreciation or appraisal which makes you strong. The explicit message is that character-building experiences are painful and this is a necessary premiss for making you strong. If you're strong, you'll be respected, is expressed in oratio recta. The perceived reality of the image below shows 9
The issue can be traced back to Aristotle (De Int. I, . 10 This view is shared by Castañeda (1983) and Bühler (1929) and taken up (to some extent) by Recanati (2007 -both verbally and non-verbally -that respect has to be earned. Hence the message: "you need to prove your worth by beeing seen as having a hard life, on the rocks, at the seaside, your head clasped in your hand." This self-perceived reality is what Castañeda calls a thin slice of a chunk of reality or "I-guise" of a vulnerable but strong twixter.
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According to Castañeda, "every statement lies implicitly, or explicitly, in oratio obliqua (indirect speech), and the only true or genuine oratio recta (direct speech) is the unspoken I think [...] or, rather, I think here now. [...] This has momentous consequences for the subject of experience" (1983, (60) (61) . The subject of experience is the perceived self in its aspects (1) and (4) and the double connection to things is via oratio recta and oratio obliqua. Hence this self is a thin slice of a chunk of reality which Castañeda names I-guise: "A self (conceived person or total chunk of reality [...]; (2) a self is a thin "slice" of such a chunk; (3) it is a "slice" (hereafter called an I-guise) that consists of being a subject of an experience (whether perceptual or one involving non-perceptual thinking); (4) secondary I-guises are potential subjects of experience; (5) an actual I-guise is a present, presented-to and self-presented subject;" (1983, 61).
Castañeda's "I-guises" correspond to Neisser's aspects of the perceived self. An actual I-guise is a present-presented-to and self-presented subject -corresponding involving perceptual or non-perceptual thinking which overlaps with (4) the assumptive self which in turn overlaps with Castañeda's (2) secondary I-guise or subject of a potential experience [Fig. 4] . "Only my daughter will be better than me! J" is a good example: the perceived self projects itself into its future, (secondary I-guise) is a potential bride with a potential daughter. Both of them projections, albeit self-presented ones. "Only my daughter will be better than me! J" is an image on the face-book site of Millenials' community "Damn it, I need you!!"
13 Oratio obliqua now (in a specious present) -how it would like its future or potential self to be, in the I guise of a bride who can be eclipsed only by her future daughter in the you-guise of a potential bride (a bride's maid). Oratio recta expresses the 12 Twixter is a term coined by Time magazine and used by Joel Stein (2013, 3) (1983, 62) .
The distinctive feature of an autobiographical self is its temporal extension or continuity spanning from what is to what was and what will be. The time of the autobiographical self is that of a temporally continuous experience in an extended present, referred to indexically as now, as Castañeda points out. This temporally continuous perceived self is extended (or perduring) because it bridges from the present across to the past and future. The autobiographical self perceives reality the past mainly on the basis of episodic memory and some semantic memory, as well as the future self of our expectations. Thus the perceived self in the "only my daughter can be better than me" I-guise can project a possible self from its present to its future, by means of epistemic data (knowledge) acquired in its personal past (about brides and bridesmaids, for instance).
other people (3). In my view, the interpersonal self is crucial for relating the various I-guises because it is a source of self-knowledge within the social environment based on perceptual information. Castañeda mentions what could correspond to Neisser's "ecological self," namely "(9) purely physical objects are systems of physical guises;" and we shall test his claim that "one and the same relation glues all guises together, whether physical or mental, or I-guises [...]" (1983, 62) . I presume that this I-guises the third-person perspective, because in social media the self is also perceived from an observer's perspective: she sees herself from her laptop or tablet connected to the web and logged into the social network. This is a tertiary I-guise, corresponding to Neisser's interpersonal self (3). The observer I-guise is not in the scene, although she is experiencing it and self-identifying with it. Hence the interpersonal self overlaps with the other I-guises and contributes perceptual information to self-awareness and self-knowledge of perceived reality, anchoring the other I-guises in a social context.
How the Interpersonal Self Can Affect the Possible (or Conceptual) Self
Expounding Neisser's notion, Daniel Stern (1993, 212) argues that the interpersonal self has two aspects, subjective and objective, respectively. In a similar vein, I take the conceptual, assumptive or possible self (4) as a doublet, comprising a projectable and a projected self, using the interpersonal self as interface between the possible (its mindset) and the virtually-actual (its online presence). I think the projectable self has a (grammatical) subject: a possible self, actualized in its online projection, whence it provides a feedback which enhances its self-concept. This projected subject provides reassuring feedback to the conceptual or assumptive self via the interpersonal self. Consider the American social network "I know I'm 'awesome,' so I don't care about your 'opinion'. pointing at the viewer -i.e. the self-perceived self -with the question: "who is the most awesome person today?" [see Fig. 5 ]. The self-perceived subject receives a reassuring feedback for its possible self: "you are the most awesome person today."
The image can be found on the FB page of a fan community. Thence its allaying their self-doubts and enhancing their self-value in a participatory culture, through spreadable media. For social networking is a cultural practice well supported by fan culture (Jenkins 2013, 9) . In addition, social networking is a source of interpersonal knowledge -such as knowing that one is the most awesome person today -which is how that spreadable content affects the perceived self in social media. The perceived storyline on this network acts as a catalyst for a different fan community: the community of the perceived self in various I-guises, from the interpersonal to the possible perceived self. In such a community, says Jenkins (2013, 151-3) , consumers are becoming producers because they are engaged in meaningful participation -writing readers, or picture-taking viewers -perceived selves in an interactive reality. An important consequence is that, due to the interpersonal self, the perceived self has acquired new dimensions: it has become a multiversal self in the virtual 2D space of a participatory culture. In addition, interpersonal self-knowledge is crucial for the perceived self because it is the perceptually based knowledge of a self in interaction with others. Today, face to face interaction with a social partner occurs online and in real time (via Skype). It seems that, for twixters at least, interaction with social partners in social media is a near equivalent to face to face interaction. First, because they usually communicate in a shared social space with members of their ecological and social niche. Second, because social partners in social media usually share the same values (since they elected or liked the same network), focus on the same events, objects, or interests, and self-evaluate with regard to their peers on the network. Consequently, the interpersonal self is important for self-recognition, which involves detecting social responses to self-actions.
Via the interpersonal self, the conceptual self receives a relational affect about its perceived status. According to Stern (1993, 206-7) , the interpersonal self has a register of so-called categorical affects, such as happiness, sadness, anger, or surprise and these can change over time. Here the temporally extended self comes in, as an autobiographical self with an idealistic narrator connecting the dots of its past and present personae. Part of the interpersonal self's affect-register are relational affects: "feelings of being loved, esteemed, thought wonderful, special or hated, and the feelings of being secure, safe, attached, alone, isolated motivation" (Stern 1993, 207) . They are interpersonal feelings arising "in the course of coordinated interactions" and they "push the limits of the interpersonal Consider Fig. 6 . "I am simply a person and I make countless mistakes, but you have no right to judge me, because it's my life," from the twixter network "Damn it, I need you."
14 A black-and-white photograph of a texting girl, presumably texting this missive, either to her bff or her boyfriend.
Interpersonal feelings arise in the course of an interaction coordinated autobiographical self -or the observer, actual and possible I-guises. These three are represented in the image, echoing the interpersonal self's affective mindsetfeeling misunderstood and depreciated and hence motivated to justify her assumed stance. The actual and possible self are projected in a virtual handshake: the actual private self, in its doublet aspects expressed by the active and passive voice. The private self has two aspects, active and passive, respectively: an active selfwhich is suffering from a harsh judgment. Seen online, the suffering is half as bad, because it is no longer passive but becomes self-effective, due to the observer's I-guise, or the projected interpersonal self which is virtually extended into a social temporally extended self which is an autobiographical self.
interpersonal self, but it too, is a doublet. On one hand, it is framed online as an autobiographical narrator from the observer's third-person I guise. On the other hand, the temporally extended self accounts for the sameness of a sense of self across the time-space between the online projection and the actual projectable self tapping its tablet (or laptop) whilst looking at the screen. This autobiographical consumption (Jenkins 2013, 153) . I suppose the perceived self's online time is analogous to dream-time (except last for an hour. There appears to be a difference in speed between the perceived be running at the same speed. The persistence and continuity of that sameness of the perceived self spans across time-space(s) since the perceived self is a self-inprocess. Its extended self-awareness is a necessary condition for putting in order psychical and virtual events. This hybrid self-awareness is warranted by a causal and a semantic link between the self, its actions and its episodes -it's spatiotemporally self-effective parts and its temporal parts.
self's motivational process: for a self to be a motivated self, it needs to notice the relation between its own actions and changes resulting from those actions (EID 2009, 453) . The perceived self in social media can construct this causal link by means of its interacting I-guises. The temporally extended autobiographical autobiographical self does this by means of its protagonist in the second person -"you" as you would like to be perceived. My claim is corroborated by Josephine response and the impact of participatory experience on virtual audience. They found that the impact occurs on an interpersonal level and that the bottom line of written across a screen showing a lovely, pensive, and unsmiling girl. This image and don't get on my nerves" -half-quoting a song by pop-folk singer Galena (2010) . 15 This autobiographical self's narrator is an idealist with an interpersonal blinds in an umber (or umbrageous) limelight. The projected self is the protagonist in the second person, as it would like to be seen (and comforted). The comforting observer-self, from the third-person guise, written by a self-narrator who knows how to heal the "you" protagonist's wounds. The autobiographical consumerauthor participates and consents by "liking" this image.
is an appraised self -even if the appraisal comes from a self-perceived sourcethe likes. Hence the virtual self perceives itself as an agent of a perceived change participates. Moreover, an appraised self is a hero in the second person. Its self, so that its value is secured by a social environment in "the warm embrace of praise," as twixter blogger Stephanie Sparer writes in "'Likes' crazy" (2011). The perceived self on FB wants to feel the warm embrace of praise, because it feels like a proverbial underdog and wants to feel like a hero. "I keep forgetting my life is about me. Not what other people think of me," writes Sparer (2011) . The perceived self's hero-paradox, seen in images 3, 6, and 7 also indicates that the perceived self wants to be admired as an underdog. The caption to Fig.  3 showing a girl at the rocky seaside, that reads "A hard life makes you strong!!," asks the underdog to be brave for its audience. Fig. 6 reads "I am simply a person and I make countless mistakes, but you have no right to judge me, because it's my life." It is an underdog pleading for her right to be heard on a website from the viewpoint of a perceived self as an underdog-website called "Bully so that they'll of the underdog. The underdog-hero may be a distinctive 21st Century feature of the perceived self in media and literature -an urban nomad, slippery, and mercurial, narcissistic and appealing. Fig. 4 , "Only my daughter will be better than me!," is emblematic of this stance. The underdog is a young hero -where "young" is a mindset rather than a biological fact -and a negotiator. The self as hero is the "market value" of the main character of the autobiographical self. If the protagonist is appraised as heroic, then it is revealed as an "I don't care about your opinion"-guise because it has received a cognitive and social sanction.
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Hence the Bulgarian twixter website has chosen an appropriate name for possible selves that in oratio obliqua would like to be seen as not caring about others' opinion, while the oratio recta expresses their nonchalance.
In a double twist on this moniker, Janky Ror's fanclub page is called "I know I'm 'awesome,' so I don't care about your 'opinion'" The quotation marks around "awesome" and "opinion" signal that this is a received view. An informed interpersonal self knows that it should be called awesome and therefore it does not care about any "opinion" expressed from a second-person-viewpoint, for peer-evaluation is phrased from a third-person-stance. The perceived self's hero paradox: "I don't care about your opinion" explicitly states an underdog's point of view and implicitly sustains an appeal for appraisal and appreciation -so there is no cognitive dissonance between what the perceived self does and believes. Rather, it wants to be acknowledged as a hero in the I-guise of an underdog interpersonal self in the social context of "what others think about me." Fig . 2, humor, another distinctive feature of the millenial generation.
Perceived Self Deviations: "I-Guise" Thieves and Fake
The downside of the hero-paradox is that the perceived self's desire to be seen and appreciated leaves digital traces which are exploited by others and used for "reality mining" or tracking people's data in order to identify predictable patterns of behavior. Blascovich and Bailenson (2011, 133-135; 154-164) use the term "digital footprints" for the virtual traces our virtual selves leave on the web. Digital footprints provide clues about the self and reveal things about its physical and psychological identity. They are used for database marketing: predicting the self's actions and response, determining the grounded self's identity and personality, collecting, tracking, and brokering their consumer habits. Consequently, in using social media we are actively helping corporate interests. In addition, today our personal data are digital collectibles easily mined by third-parties (Marwick 2014) .
Digital footprints also foster abuse. Consider Bianca Bosker, a girl whose FB identity was stolen by someone who created a virtual "Bianca Bosker" identity [see staring back at me" (Bosker 2012). The desire to be seen can rebound unexpectedly: one day you realize that you're being watched and that the information you provided -and then friend the real me?" Bosker asks (2012). Performance artist Daiimah Mubashshir has a reply: "FB and Google are not at all interested in recreating identity piece is just a selling point to keep its users interested."
17 Mubashshir has work about being black and lesbian in an Islamic environment, and another for her "old" self, for family and friends, who are not familiar with her work. Although FB has a real world name policy, many virtual selves on FB are not matched to a grounded user in a way that their author or audience would practices depending on a producer-consumer relation: Bosker is a consumer who doesn't know the impostor-producer of her fake FB, while Mubashshir is the producer of two FB identities for two different consumer groups which do not recognize her complete identity. Both FB "I-guises" use pseudonyms, but the conditions and motives of this usage are very different (Genette 1987, 50-55) .
without the latter's permission and no right of ownership. The producer of two to avoid being evaluated by the wrong audience. Her reason for having fake FB Consumer-writer Alicia Eler (2012) provides another reason for creating a fake "Baumshaquita (Baum for short) is not a real person. She is a sketch comedy character that I created and sometimes refer to as my 'alter ego.'" A real author and grounded self produces an imaginary pseudo-self with some attributes different from the author's: "One time she notso-subtly hit on the person that I was dating. Baum is a general disrupter and Internet loudmouth [...] . She knows a lot of folks that I don't." pre-teens are on FB without complying with the terms of service because they like to play games and communicate online. However, the incongruence between above, a virtual self leaves digital footprints. Those traces remain, even if the users which outlive them as virtual memorials, unless family members have submitted a request to deactivate the account.
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Against Technoconsumerism and Social Media
Last, rethinking the perceived self in social media also involves critiques, such as Dave Eggers's (2013) satire on social media, The Circle. Voted "most admired company four years running," the Circle is a social media corporation combining FB, Google, Twitter, Paypal, Pinternet and others. "There were no more passwords, no multiple identities. Your devices knew what you were and your own identity […] was the person paying, signing up, responding, viewing and reviewing, seeing and being seen. You had to use your real name, and this was tied to your credit cards, your bank and thus paying for anything was simple. One button for the rest of your life online" (Eggers 2013, 20-21) .
The novel mocks the impact of social media on the perceived self, showing how the protagonist, Mae, becomes immersed in the Circle's virtual reality as she battles to increase her participation scores an appraisals. Besides, The Circle is a case of transmedial metalepsis, because it transgresses textual and extratextual boundaries. The author jumps across diegetic (narrative) worlds, combining context in the novel. Second, the author-reader relation spans across the text whose storyline and storyworld parodies social media. The world in which one tells is shifted to the world of which one tells and thus the author manipulates the causal relation between himself, his work, the subject and the audience (Genette 2004, 14; 27; 31 story in a teen that performs on a chat-room stripper site. A teenager attempts suicide after being bullied by a fake FB identity created by his classmates. After losing their child, a couple stalks the suspect who stole their identity online. Last but not least, my paper could also be seen as a case of transmedial metalepsis: I'm talking about the perceived self in FB-powered reality, jump across to critiques of the perceived self in social media, and cross the textual and intratextual boundaries by communicating it with extratextual readers.
Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to re-think the perceived self in social media, analyzing the various aspects of that self or I-guise. A spin-off from my analysis reveals what child psychologists call the social contingency detection (EID 2009, 446-449) . On this view, infants develop a sense of self only if they can construe a sense of reciprocity with others and a sense of participation in a socio-cultural context. Our perceived self's sense of self depends on its possibility to detect matches or I-guises. Perhaps the projected self "you, as you would like to be perceived" matches perceptually based knowledge of interacting with others in a narrative by an autobiographical self seeking to appreciate itself in the eyes of others. The perceived self in social media wants to detect a matching of its self-appreciation with social appraisal -in an online mirror, so to speak. This virtual mirror is the perceived self's means to an end, because it affectively biases responses (the likes) while the self notes the effect of its behavior. Detection of social contingency is a work in process and the perceived self is a project to be continued. I-guises" with shifty origins.
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